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CONTRACT LAW: New Mexico Interprets the Insurance
Clause in the Oil and Gas Anti-Indemnity Statute: Amoco
Production Co. v. Action Well Service, Inc.

I. INTRODUCTION
Until 1971, the New Mexico courts and legislature permitted contractual indemnity agreements that required one party to assume
legal and financial responsibility for another party's negligence.' In
1971, the New Mexico Legislature created a limitation on indemnity
agreements pertaining to wells for oil, gas, or water or mineral
mines. 2 The well and mine anti-indemnity statute prohibits indemnity
agreements obligating one party to pay for the sole or concurrent
negligence attributable to the other party in contracts pertaining to
a well or mine.3 The statute declares such agreements to be void
and unenforceable as against the public policy of New Mexico.' It
also provides that the validity of any insurance contract will not be
affected by the statute.'
In Amoco Production Co. v. Action Well Service, Inc. ,6 a case
of first impression, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the

1. Metropolitan Pav. Co. v. Gordon Herkenhoff & Assoc., 66 N.M. 41, 341 P.2d 460
(1959).
2. N.M. STAT. ANN. 1978 § 56-7-2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1986). This section provides:
A. Any agreement, covenant or promise contained in, collateral to or affecting
any agreement pertaining to any well for oil, gas or water, or mine for any
mineral, which purports to indemnify the indemnitee against loss or liability
for damages, for:
(1) death or bodily injury to persons; or
(2) injury to property; or
(3) any loss, damage or expense arising under either Paragraph (1) or (2)
or both; or
(4) any combination of these, arising from the sole or concurrent negligence
of the indemnitee or the agents or employees of the indemnitee or any
independent contractor who is directly responsible to the indemnitee, or from
any accident which occurs in operations carried on at the direction or under
the supervision of the indemnitee or an employee or representative of the
indemnitee or in accordance with methods and means specified by the indetnnitee or employees or representatives of the indemnitee, is against public
policy and is void and unenforceable. This provision shall not affect the
validity of any insurance contract or any benefit conferred by the Workmen's
Compensation Act [Chapter 52, Article I NMSA 19781.
In the same year the legislature also created a limitation for construction contracts. See infra
note 38.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 107 N.M. 208, 755 P.2d 52 (1988).
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legislature did not intend the insurance clause in the well and gas
anti-indemnity statute to function as an exception to the statute.7
At issue was a contract between Amoco, a well owner, and Action
Well Service, the independent contractor on the site.' The contract
included an indemnity provision which required Action Well Service
to indemnify Amoco for all losses arising from the work, including
losses caused by Amoco's own negligence. 9 In addition, the contract
required Action Well Service to cover this assumption of the risk
with liability insurance.' 0 In Action Well Service, the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that Amoco could not require Action Well
Service to indemnify Amoco for Amoco's own negligence with contractual liability insurance purchased by Action Well Service pursuant
to its promise to insure the indemnity agreement." According to the
court, the legislature intended the insurance clause in the statute to
guarantee only that in the oil, gas, and mineral industries each
2
contracting party could insure itself to protect its own interest.'
This Note first describes the decision in Action Well Service. The
Note then discusses the historical background for interpretation of
the anti-indemnity statute and reviews the New Mexico Supreme
Court's reason for interpreting the statute's insurance clause narrowly. Finally, the Note considers the implications of Action Well
Service for companies working in the oil, gas, and mineral industries.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 15, 1984, at an oil field site owned and maintained by
Amoco Production Company [Amoco], Freddie Wagoner, a derrick
man for Action Well Service, was killed when the drilling rig upon
which he was standing collapsed."' Wagoner's personal representative
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas alleging Amoco's negligence for failing to provide a safe
workplace and failing to supervise the drilling rig operation.' 4 Amoco
demanded that Action Well Service defend the Texas lawsuit. Action
Well Service refused. Subsequently, Amoco settled with Wagoner's
estate for $500,000.'1
Amoco and Action Well Service were parties to a contract that
included an indemnification clause. 16 Relying on the contract, Amoco

7. Id. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 209, 755 P.2d at 53.
14. Brief for Appellee at 2, Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., Inc., 107 N.M. 208,
755 P.2d 52 (1988).
15. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., Inc., 107 N.M. at 209, 755 P.2d at 53.
16. Id.
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brought suit against Action Well Service seeking indemnification for7
its settlement with Wagoner's estate, attorneys' fees, and court costs.1
Action Well Service filed a motion to dismiss Amoco's lawsuit,
contending that the indemnification paragraph of the contract violated the well and mine anti-indemnity statute. 8
Paragraph 10 of the well and lease service contract between Amoco
and Action Well Service provided:
10. In order to eliminate controversies between Contractor, [Action Well Service] its Subcontractors and Amoco and its joint
owners, if any, and their respective insurers, Contractor assumes
all liability for and hereby agrees to defend, indemnify and hold
Amoco, its joint owner or owners, if any, and their insurers,
harmless from and against any and all losses, costs, expenses
and causes of action, including attorneys' fees and court costs,
for injuries to and death of Contractor's and its Subcontractor's
employees, arising out of, incident to, or in connection with
any and all operations under this contract and whether or not
such losses, costs, expenses and causes of action are occasioned
by or incident to or the result of the negligence of Amoco, its
joint owner or owners, if any, and its agents, representatives
and employees. Contractor agrees to insure this assumption of
liability. The liability assumed by Contractor pursuant to this
clause shall be limited to the amounts carried by Contractor's
current liability insurance, but in no event shall it be less than
the minimum limits set out in Paragraph 11(b), below. 9
The contract specified the amounts and kinds of insurance Action
Well Service was obligated to purchase.20

17. Id.

18. Id. at 210, 755 P.2d at 54.
19. Brief for Appellee at 3, Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., Inc., 107 N.M. 208,
755 P.2d 52 (1988).
20. The contract states in pertinent part:
11. As to all operations provided for herein, Contractor shall secure and
maintain during the term of this agreement the following insurance:
(a) Workman's Compensation Insurance which shall fully comply with the
requirements of state laws as well as federal laws, if applicable,
(b) Comprehensive General Liability Insurance, including Contractual Liability coverage, with minimum limits of $100,000.00 each person and
$300,000.00 each occurrence for Bodily Injury and $100,000.00 each occurrence for Property Damage.
(c) Automobile Liability Insurance covering owned, hired and non-owned
vehicles used by Contractor with minimum limits of $100,000.00 each person
and $300,000.00 each occurrence for Bodily Injury and $100,000.00 each
occurrence for Property Damage.
If requested by Amoco, Contractor shall furnish Amoco insurance certificates to evidence the insurance required herein. Maintaining the prescribed
insurance shall not relieve Contractor of any other obligation under this
agreement.
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Following the agreement, Action Well Service purchased two policies of contractual liability insurance. 2 One policy with United
General Insurance Company allowed $300,000 single limits for each
occurrence of bodily injury; the other, an umbrella policy with
Harbor Insurance Company, covered bodily injury with single limits
of $1,000,000 each.Y
Amoco argued that it should be indemnified by the insurance
policies Action Well Service had purchased because the insurance
clause in the well and mine anti-indemnity statute was intended to
allow indemnity agreements if covered by insurance. Amoco maintained that the insurance clause in the statute would protect the
validity of any agreement between two contracting oilfield companies
concerning their insurance coverage.2
The Eleventh Judicial District Court rejected Amoco's argument
and dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it failed to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted because the indemnity
agreement between Amoco and Action Well Service violated the well
and mine anti-indemnity statute.25 The court held that the insurance
clause in the statute did not allow indemnification of a negligent
party under an indemnity agreement supported by insurance obtained
26
by the other party.
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the district court. 27 It
agreed that the insurance clause in the statute does not create an
exception to the prohibition of indemnity agreements covering indemnitee negligence in well and mine contracts. The statute only
protects a party's right to insure its own interests, not the interests
of the other party. 2 To arrive at its decision, the court referred to
the public policy behind the statute: the promotion of safety in the
occupations pertaining
to wells and mines known for their dangerous
29
working conditions.
The court refused to permit indemnification of Amoco through
liability insurance purchased by Action Well Service to cover the
indemnity agreement, thus denying Amoco's claim for indemnification for the $500,000 it owed Wagoner's estate, attorneys' fees,
30
and costs.

21. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., Inc., 107 N.M. at 209, 755 P.2d at 53.
22. Id.
23. Brief for Appellant at 20, Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., Inc., 107 N.M.
208, 755 P.2d 52 (1988).
24. Id.
25. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., Inc., 107 N.M. at 209, 755 P.2d at 53.
26. Id. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55.
27. Id. at 212, 755 P.2d at 56.
28. "Therefore, we conclude that subparagraph (4) applies to insurance purchased by the
indemnitor to protect its interests, and not the interests of the indemnitee." Id. at 211, 755
P.2d at 55.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A. Historical Background
In industries that use independent contractors and subcontractors,
contracts frequently contain provisions obligating the independent
contractor to indemnify and hold the project owner harmless as to
loss, liability, injuries, or damages arising from the independent
contractor's performance under the contract." At common law, New
Mexico upheld these contracts as not against public policy.2 The
New Mexico Supreme Court recognized, however, that assuming
liability for another's negligence put an extra financial obligation
upon the indemnitor.1 Therefore, the court required that the in3
demnitor's intention to be so obligated be clear and unequivocal. 1
Many states have imposed statutory limitations on indemnity agreements that protect one party from liability for its own negligence."
These anti-indemnity statutes pertain to hazardous work such as
general construction and work on mines for minerals or wells for
oil and gas.36 During the 1971 legislative session, New Mexico passed
two separate statutes limiting a party's ability to contract for indemnification.17 The construction anti-indemnity statute voids agreements to indemnify a party, in whole or in part, for its own negligence

31. Annotation, Indemnity-Contractor'sLiability, 27 A.L.R.3d 663, 675 (1%9).
32. Metrbpolitan Paing Co. v. Gordon Herkenhoff and Assoc., 66 N.M. at 43, 341 P.2d
at 462 (upholding an indemnity agreement which provided that a road contractor would hold
the city harmless from all suits brought against the city on account of construction, even if
the suit arose out of the city's own negligence).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 46, 341 P.2d at 463. Many states require express provision for the indemnitor's
added assumption of risk where one party agrees to indemnify the other for the other's
negligence. Id. The Metropolitan Paving Co. court considered, but reject&l, this higher
standard, preferring instead the "clear and unequivocal" standard. Id. at 43, 341 P.2d at
461; Eichel v. Goode, 101 N.M. 246, 250, 680 P.2d 627, 631 (Ct. App. 1984).
35. More than half the states have enacted either a construction work anti-indemnity
statute or an oil, gas, and mineral work anti-indemnity statute. See, e.g., AiAsxA STAT.] §
45.45.900 (1986); ARtz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 34-226 (Cum. Supp. 1988); CAL. Crv. CODE §
2782 (West 1974); IDAHO CODE § 29-114 (1980); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5305 (1984); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 29(C) (West Cum. Supp. 1989); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 338-A:! (Repl. Pamp. 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:40A-I (West Repl. Pamp.
1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 56-3-18 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-8-1 (Repl. Pamp.
1986).
36. Id.
37. Although the two anti-indemnity statutes are codified one after the other, the two
bills were introduced by different legislators and passed at different times. Senator Ray L.
Atchison introduced the anti-indemnity statute concerning construction of real property as
Senate Bill 189, and the bill became law on March 1, 1971. S.B. 189, 30th Leg., 1st Sess.
(1971 N.M.). Representative Robert Moran introduced the anti-indemnity statute concerning
wells and mines from the House Judiciary Committee as House Bill 361, and the bill became
law on April 2, 1971. H.B.J. 361, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (1971 N.M.).
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in construction work on or under real property.3" The well and mine
anti-indemnity statute voids agreements to indemnify a party for its
sole or concurrent negligence in the operation of wells for oil, gas,
or water and in mines for minerals. 9
A New Mexico court first interpreted the well and mine antiindemnity statute in Guitard v. Gulf Oil Co. 40 In Guitard, an employee of Harrison Western was injured on a mining project run
by Gulf. 4' Harrison Western was a contractor for Gulf.4 2 The employee sued Gulf for failure to inspect and maintain equipment and
failure to warn of defects.4 3 Gulf filed a third-party complaint against
Harrison Western for indemnification under a construction and development contract. That contract included an indemnity clause hold-

38. Section 56-7-1 provides:
Indemnity Agreements
56-7-1. [Real property; negligence, acts or omissions of indemnitee; certain
agreements void.]
Any provision, contained in any agreement relating to the construction,
installation, alteration, modification, repair, maintenance, servicing, demolition, excavation, drilling, reworking, grading, paving, clearing, site preparation or development, of any real property or any improvement of any
kind whether on, above or under real property, including without limitation,
buildings, shafts, wells and structures, by which any party to the agreement
agrees to indemnify the indemnitee, or the agents and employees of the
indemnitee, against liability, claims, damages, losses or expenses, including
attorney fees, arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property
caused by, or resulting from, in whole or in part, the negligence, act or
omission of the indemnitee or the agents or employees of the indemnitee,
or any legal entity for whose negligence, acts or omissions any of them may
be liable, is against public policy and is void and unenforceable, unless such
provision shall provide that the agreement to indemnify shall not extend to
liability, claims, damages, losses or expenses, including attorney fees, arising
out of:
A. the preparation or approval of maps, drawings, opinions, reports,
surveys, change orders, designs or specifications by the indemnitee, or the
agents or employees of the indemnitee; or
B. the giving of or the failure to give directions or instructions by the
indemnitee, or the agents or employees of the indemnitee, where such giving
or failure to give directions or instructions is the primary cause of bodily
injury to persons or damage to property.
The word "indemnify" as used in this section includes, without limitation,
an agreement to remedy damage or loss caused in whole or in part by the
negligence, act or omission of the indemnitee, the agents or employees of
the indemnitee, or any legal entity for whose negligence, acts or omissions
any of the foregoing may be liable.
39. See supra note 2. The original language in section 56-7-2 was identical to section 567-1 with the exception of parts A and B. See supra note 38. The final form of section 567-2 which passed into law, "Substitute House Bill" 361, is a near duplicate of the Wyoming
anti-indemnity statute, WYo. STAT. § 30-28.3 (Cum. Supp. 1975). See Legislative Council
Service file for N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-2(A) (Repi. Pamp. 1986), opened by Robert Moran,
the introducing Representative.
40. 100 N.M. 358, 670 P.2d 969 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 327, 670 P.2d 581
(1983), followed in Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689, 696, 712 P.2d 1351, 1358 (1985).
41. Id. at 359, 670 P.2d at 970.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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ing Gulf harmless for all losses except those resulting from Gulf's
sole negligence."
The trial court granted Harrison Western's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that under the well and mine anti-indemnity
statute the indemnity agreement was entirely void even if Gulf's
negligence contributed to the harm only in part. 45 The New Mexico
Court of Appeals considered whether the statutory language "arising
from the . . . concurrent negligence of the indemnitee" voided an
indemnity agreement where both contracting parties shared in the
6
fault
Harrison Western argued that by using the words "concurrent
negligence," the statute voided the entire indemnity agreement if
Gulf were negligent to any degree. 47 Gulf contended, on the other
hand, that the statutory language, "arising from . . . the concurrent
negligence of the indemnitee,"' 8 meant only "that the indemnitee
49
cannot contract away liability for his own percentage of negligence."
The Court of Appeals agreed with Gulf, upholding the indemnity
contract insofar as it did not require Harrison Western to indemnify
Gulf for Gulf's negligence, and reversed the lower court's summary
judgment for Harrison Western. 0 Thus Harrison Western, though
it would not be liable under the indemnity agreement for Gulf's
percentage of negligence, would apparently be liable for other losses
sustained by Gulf as a result of Gulf's relationship with Harrison
Western."
The court explained that the public policy underlying the well and
mine anti-indemnity statute was to promote safety in the dangerous
working conditions associated with mines and wells. 5 2 Requiring each
party to bear responsibility for its own percentage of negligence

44. Id. The contract included the following clause: "Contractor shall not be liable for
any loss, damage or claims which are determined to be due to the sole negligence of Owner."
Id. at 362, 670 P.2d at 973.
45. Id. at 359, 670 P.2d at 970.
46. Id. at 360, 670 P.2d at 971. The legislature passed section 56-7-2(A) before New
Mexico adopted pure comparative negligence in Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234
(1981), and abolished joint and several liability in Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply,
Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982).

The statutory language "sole or concurrent negligence" may have reflected the law of
contribution current at that time. Under joint and several liability a concurrent tortfeasor
could be held liable for the entire amount of damages. Id. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581. Thus,
the only way to prevent a party's indemnification for its own negligence would be for the
legislature to void contracts that provided indemnification for not only the party's entire
fault, but also its partial fault.
47. Guitard, 100 N.M. at 360, 670 P.2d at 971.
48. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-2(A)(4) (RepI. Pamp. 1986).
49. Guitard, 100 N.M. at 360, 670 P.2d at 971. In reaching this conclusion Guitard
followed the interpretation of a similar Wyoming statute construed in Mountain Fuel Supply
Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d 1351 (Wyo. 1978). See supra note 39.
50. Guitard, 100 N.M. at 362, 670 P.2d at 973.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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would give all parties incentives to monitor the safety of the operations." As a result, a negligent party should not be able to
insulate itself from liability by inserting into its contracts an indemnity
provision covering its negligence. The court found its interpretation
of the statute's language to be consistent with the ruling in Bartlett
v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc. 4 that concurrent tortfeasors
are not liable for the entire amount of damage." Thus Guitard

aligned the pre-Bartlett statute with the doctrine of comparative
negligence. 6
The court in Guitard suggested three situations where an indemnity
agreement would be permissible in a contract pertaining to a well
or mine. In the first example the court posited Gulf's negligence at
1% and Harrison Western's at 99q/0. Without explanation, the
court stated that Gulf might be held 100% liable in such a case."

The court, however, was aware of Bartlett because it cited the case.

9

Because the result in the court's example would be almost impossible
under a negligence theory, given New Mexico's comparative negligence rule, ° the example may have been intended to represent the
situation where a vicariously liable master's claim for indemnification
from the primary tortfeasor is barred because the master was partially
at fault. 6' Historically, any fault of the master barred its indemnification by the servant. 62 Apparently the court was suggesting that
where a party was held liable under a theory of vicarious or secondary
liability, it could be indemnified under an indemnity contract.6 3

53. Id.

54. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794
(1982). In 1987 the legislature passed the Several Liability Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A1 (Repl. Pamp. 1989), which codifies judicially created several liability in cases where comparative negligence applies. The statute enumerates in subsection C the circumstances under
which joint and several liability will continue to apply:
C. The doctrine imposing joint and several liability shall apply:
(1) to any person or persons who acted with the intention of inflicting injury
or damage;
(2) to any persons whose relationship to each other would make one person
vicariously liable for the acts of the other, but only to that portion of the
total liability attributed to those persons;
(3) to any persons strictly liable for the manufacture and sale of a defective
product, but only to that portion of the total liability attributed to those
persons; or
(4) to situations not covered by any of the foregoing and having a sound
basis in public policy.
See Schultz and Occhialino. Statutory Adoption of Several Liability in New Mexico: A
Commentary and Quasi.Legislative History, 18 N.M. L. Rav. 483 (1988).
55. Guitard, 100 N.M. at 362, 670 P.2d at 973.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 361, 670 P.2d at 972.
58. Id.
59. Id.at 362, 670 P.2d at 973.
60. Id. at 361, 670 P.2d at 972.
61. See infra note 156.
62. Id.
63. For Wyoming's rule see Heckart v. Viking Exploration, Inc., 673 F.2d 309, 314 (10th
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The second example of a valid indemnity agreement cited by
Guitard came from City of Artesia v. Carter.64 The city settled a
wrongful death action with the widow of an employee of one of
the city's contractors. 65 The contractor had paid workmen's compensation benefits which relieved the contractor of any common law
liability to the widow of the deceased employee." Furthermore, the
public policy behind workmen's compensation barred indemnification
of the city by the contractor for liability arising out of the contractor's
negligence if the city's claim were based on an implied right of
indemnification at common law.6 7 The city therefore sued the contractor under a contractual right based on an indemnity agreement
that required the contractor to reimburse the city for the contractor's
negligence. The contractor attempted to avoid its obligation under
shelter of the workmen's compensation public policy limiting employer liability, but the court upheld the indemnity agreement.6
Although a negligent employer would no longer be liable at common
law for indemnifying a vicariously liable third party, the employer
would be liable if it had expressly contracted to indemnify the third
party.6 9
Finally, the Guitard court noted that on remand Harrison Western
might also be held liable for court costs as agreed in the indemnity
contract. 70 After Guitard the only indemnity agreements prohibited
by the well and mine anti-indemnity statute are those in7 which one
party assumes liability for the other party's negligence .

Cir. 1982). The Tenth Circuit, relying on Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Emerson, 578 P.2d
1351 (Wyo. 1978), see supra note 49, held that a party could not be indemnified if its
negligence were of the secondary variety-failure to inspect or failure to prevent, but where
the party to be indemnified was not negligent and only liable under a theory of respondeat
superior, it would be entitled to indemnity. Heckart, 673 F.2d at 314.
64. 94 N.M. 311, 610 P.2d 198 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545
(1980).
65. Id. at 312, 610 P.2d at 199.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 312-13, 610 P.2d at 199-200.
70. 100 N.M. at 363, 670 P.2d at 974. For Louisiana's rule see, e.g. Wailer v. Chevron,
USA, Inc., 630 F.Supp. 313 (M.D. La. 1986) (defense costs are not barred by oil and gas
anti-indemnity statute if the indemnitee is free of fault).
71. In Sierra v. Garcia, 106 N.M. 573, 746 P.2d 1105 (1987), the court came to the
opposite conclusion when asked to construe similar language in the sister statute, section 567-1. See supra note 38. In Sierra the personal representative of an employee who died from
injuries sustained while working on a construction project brought suit against the general
contractor. Sierra, 106 N.M. at 574, 746 P.2d at 1106. Pursuant to an indemnity agreement,
the general contractor filed a third-party complaint against the subcontractor who had hired
the deceased worker. Id. The subcontractor moved for dismissal on the grounds that section
56-7-1 rendered the indemnity agreement void. Id. The lower court dismissed the complaint,
and the supreme court affirmed. Id. Thus, Sierra voided the entire indemnity contract, unlike
Guitard which voided the contract only insofar as it required indemnification by one for the
other's negligence.
In reaching the decision that indemnity contracts falling under section 56-7-1 are void in
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The New Mexico Supreme Court -followed Guitard in Tipton v.
Texaco, Inc.. 7 In Tipton, an employee injured on a Texaco well
site sued Texaco for negligence. 7" Texaco's independent contractor,
X-Pert, was the employer of the injured worker. 74 Texaco filed a
third-party complaint against X-Pert, claiming a contractual right
of indemnification as a result of an indemnity provision in a work
agreement between Texaco and X-Pert. 7 The trial court dismissed
X-Pert from the lawsuit, holding the indemnity provision void under
section 56-7-2(A).7 6 Citing Guitard, the New Mexico Supreme Court
reversed.77 It approved the language in Guitard that " 'arising from
the concurrent negligence of the indemnitee' means only that the
indemnitee cannot contract away liability for his percentage of negligence. "78 As a result Texaco could enforce the indemnity contract
except insofar as it might require X-Pert to indemnify Texaco for
Texaco's own negligence. 79 Neither the court in Guitard nor Tipton
had occasion to interpret the insurance clause in section 56-7-2(A).
Until Action Well Service the insurance clause of New Mexico's
oil and gas anti-indemnity statute had been discussed only by federal
courts.8 0 In Brashar v. Mobil Oil Corp.,81 the federal district court
in New Mexico determined that where Texas law was applied to a

Texas contract in a New Mexico forum under a conflict of law
principle,8 2 the court could prohibit enforcement of a judgment in
New Mexico on a cause of action created in another state if the

judgment were against strong New Mexico public policy. 83 Under

their entirety if they purport to indemnify the indemnitee for any loss arising in whole or
in part from the indemnitee's negligence, the court distinguished Guitard on the basis of the
different language in the two statutes. Id. Section 56-7-1 includes two subsections, see supra
note 38, which create exceptions to the statute's proscriptions.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Ransom argued that the court's voiding of all indemnity
agreements under section 56-7-1 not meeting exceptions A or B is contrary to the rule
established in Bartlett that each negligent party be liable for its own percentage of fault. Id.
(Ransom, J., dissenting). Justice Walters joined in Justice Ransom's dissent and noted that
the "sole or concurrent" language of section 56-7-2 is synonymous with the "in whole or
in part" language of section 56-7-1. Id. (Walters, J., dissenting).
72. 103 N.M. 689, 696, 712 P.2d 1351, 1358 (1985).
73. Id.at 690, 712 P.2d at 1352 (1985).
74. Id.
75. Id.at 690, 712 P.2d at 1352. The indemnity agreement provided that X-Pert would
hold Texaco harmless for losses arising out of the work except "such as may result solely

from Texaco's negligence." Id. at 696, 712 P.2d at 1358.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Guitard, 100 N.M. at 361, 670 P.2d at 972).
79. Id. at 696, 670 P.2d at 1358.
80. Brashar v. Mobil Oil Corp., 626 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.M. 1984); Herrera v. Amoco

Prod. Co., 623 F. Supp. 378 (D.N.M. 1985), affid, 843 F.2d 1394 (10th Cir. 1988), order
withdrawn on reh'g, 854 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1988). Damages were adjudicated in Herrera
v. Amoco Production Co., 629 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.M. 1986), rev'd, 843 F.2d 1394 (10th
Cir. 1988), order withdrawn on reh'g, 854 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1988).
81. 626 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.M. 1984).
82. Id.at 436 (citing RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 612 (1934)).

83. Id.
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the Texas statute, indemnity agreements in which one contracting
party agrees to insure against both parties' liability are expressly
permitted. Section 127.005(a) of the Texas statute provides:
[This prohibition of indemnity agreements for a party's own
negligence does not apply] . . . if the parties agree in writing
that the indemnity obligation will be supported by available
84
liability insurance coverage to be furnished by the indemnitor.
The court in Brashar,citing Guitard, noted that New Mexico's statute
prevents a party from contracting away its own liability for negligence. 85 However, the court did not refer in its analysis to the
underlying public policy elaborated by Guitard.86 The court simply
stated that application of Texas' anti-indemnity statute permitting
indemnity agreements up to allowable limits of insurance would not
be so far outside New Mexico public policy as to make the Texas
contract unenforceable by a New Mexico forum. 87 In dicta the court
went further and proposed that the statute permitted a party to
provide for indemnification by insurance for the negligence of both
parties.8 8 The court enforced the Texas indemnity contract because
Texas law permits an indemnity contract for a party's own negligence
if covered by insurance. 89
In Herrera v. Amoco Production Co., 90 the federal district court
considered whether New Mexico law permitted an indemnity agreement for a party's own negligence if insured. An employee of Aztec
Well Servicing Company who was injured on the job brought suit
against Amoco. 9' Amoco filed a third-party complaint against Aztec
Well Servicing Company for indemnification under an indemnity
contract.9 Without mention of Guitard, the only New Mexico case

interpreting the statute, the district court relied on the dicta in
Brashar to hold that Amoco had a right to impose on Aztec Well
Servicing Company an obligation to purchase liability insurance
protecting Amoco from liability for Amoco's own negligence. 9 On
appeal the Tenth Circuit disregarded Guitard because Guitard did
not involve a claim under the insurance clause of the well and mine

84. TExA Civ. PRc. & REM. CODE ANN., § 127.005 (Vernon 1986). See infra note 114.
85. 626 F. Supp. at 436-37.
86. 100 N.M. at 362, 670 P.2d at 973.
87. Brashar, 626 F. Supp. at 437; see also Amicus Curiae Brief for Aztec Well Servicing,
Inc., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., Inc., 107 N.M 208, 755 P.2d 52 (1988).
88. Brashar, 626 F. Supp. at 437.
89. Id.
90. 623 F. Supp. 378 (D.N.M. 1985), aff'd, 843 F.2d 1394 (10th Cir. 1988), order withdrawn
on reh'g, 854 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1988).
91. Id. at 379.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 379-80.
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anti-indemnity statute. 94 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court,
again without considering the public policy underlying the statute.
The Tenth Circuit held that the New Mexico anti-indemnity statute,
through the insurance clause, permitted an agreement indemnifying
a party for its negligence if the agreement were covered by insurance
purchased by the indemnitor. 9
A New Mexico court for the first time interpreted the insurance
clause in Amoco Production Co. v. Action Well Service.9 In Action
Well Service, the New Mexico Supreme Court declared the federal
court's interpretation in Herrera of the statute's insurance clause to
be incorrect.Y The court looked to the public policy behind the
statute in support of safety in the oil field. 98 The Action Well Service
court held that the public policy underlying the statute would not
permit the use of liability insurance purchased by one party to
protect an indemnity agreement covering the other party's negligence. 99 The public policy promoting workplace safety required each
party to remain liable for its own negligence.1°° The court stated
that the insurance clause protects a party's right to insure its own
interests, not the interests of the indemnitee.' 0 '
B. The Court's Reasoning in Action Well Service
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Action Well Service had to
determine if the well and mine anti-indemnity statute voided only
an uninsured agreement to indemnify a party for its liability resulting
from its own negligence. 0 2 The relevant sentence of the statute reads:
This provision shall not affect the validity of any insurance
contract or any benefit conferred by the Workmen's Compensation Act.' 03
The question arising from the statutory language is whether the
legislature intended to except from the prohibition of the statute
those indemnity provisions that were covered by insurance purchased
to support the contractually assumed liability.10 Amoco maintained
that an indemnity agreement between two parties, neither an insurance company, would be enforceable if the indemnitor purchased

94. Id. On rehearing after the decision of New Mexico's Supreme Court in Action Well
Service, the Tenth Circuit withdrew its order and reversed the district court. 843 F.2d 1323
(10th Cir. 1988).
95. Herrera, 843 F.2d 1394.
96. 107 N.M. 208, 755 P.2d 52 (1988).
97. Id. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
104. 107 N.M. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55.
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a valid insurance contract to cover the indemnity agreement. 105 Amoco
argued that prohibiting its reimbursement under Action Well Service's
liability insurance contract amounted to affecting the validity of the
insurance contract, a result expressly proscribed by the insurance

clause. 106
Action Well Service, on the other hand, maintained that the
legislature intended the words "insurance contract," to denote nothing more than a standard liability policy purchased by a party from
an insurance company to cover the party's own negligence. 107 Under
Action Well Service's interpretation, the legislature's purpose in
including the clause was to make clear that the legislature did not
contemplate eliminating a party's right to recoup losses arising from
its own negligence through "indemnification" by an insurance contract. 108

The New Mexico Supreme Court was unsatisfied with the Brashar
court's flat assertion that the New Mexico insurance clause permitted
insured indemnity agreements.' 0 9 The court noted that the Texas antiindemnity statute"0 applied in Brashar was different from the New

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 210, 755 P.2d at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id.
107 N.M. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55.

110. The statute reads in relevant part:
Chapter 127. INDEMNITY PROVISIONS IN CERTAIN MINERAL
AGREEMENTS
127.002. Finding; Agreements Against Public Policy
(a) The legislature finds that an inequity is fostered on certain contractors
by the indemnity provisions in some agreements pertaining to wells for oil,
gas, or water or to mines for other minerals.
(b) Certain agreements that provide for indemnification of a negligent
indemnitee are against the public policy of this state.
127.003. Agreement Void and Unenforceable
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, a covenant, promise,
agreement, or understanding contained in, collateral to, or affecting an
agreement pertaining to a well for oil, gas, or water or to a mine for a
mineral is void if it purports to indemnify a person against loss or liability
for damage that:
(1) is caused by or results from the sole or concurrent negligence of the
indemnitee, his agent or employee, or an individual contractor directly responsible to the indemnitee; and
(2) arises from:
(A) personal injury or death;
(B) property injury; or
(C) any other loss, damage, or expense that arises from personal injury,
death, or property injury.
127.005. Insurance Coverage
(a) This chapter does not apply to an agreement that provides for indemnity
with respect to claims for personal injury or death to the indemnitor's
employees or agents or to the employees or agents of the indemnitor's
subcontractors if the parties agree in writing that the indemnity obligation
will be supported by available liability insurance coverage to be furnished
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Mexico anti-indemnity statute."' Whereas the New Mexico statute
contains only one reference to insurance," ' the Texas anti-indemnity
statute" 3 contains two separate insurance clauses. One of the Texas4

clauses is worded similarly to New Mexico's single insurance clause. "1
The other Texas insurance clause uses express language permitting
indemnity agreements covered by insurance.' The Action Well Service court concluded that without additional language explaining the
New Mexico insurance clause, the Brashar court could not have
interpreted it simply by means of the plain language."16 A court
could only correctly interpret the insurance clause by looking to the

by the indemnitor.
(b) The indemnity obligation is limited to the extent of the coverage and
dollar limits of insurance the indemnitor has agreed to furnish.
(c) The amount of insurance required may not exceed 12 times the state's
basic limits for personal injury, as approved by the State Board of Insurance
in accordance with Article 5.15, insurance Code.
127.006. Insurance Contract; Worker's Compensation
This chapter does not affect:
(1) the validity of an insurance contract; or
(2) a benefit conferred by the workers' compensation statutes of this state.
TEXAS Crv. P.Ac. & Ra. CODE ANr., §§ 127.002 to 127.006 (Vernon 1986).
111. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., 107 N.M. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55; N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 56-7-2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
112. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
113. TEXAS Crv. PRAc. & REm. CODE ANN., §§ 127.001 to 127.008 (Vernon 1986).
114. Compare N.M.* STAT. AN. § 56-7-2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1986) ("This provision shall
not affect the validity of any insurance contract.") with TEXAS Crv. PRAc. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 127.006 (Vernon 1986) ("This chapter does not affect the validity of an insurance
contract.").
115. The statute reads in relevant part:
(a) This chapter does not apply to an agreement that provides for indemnity
with respect to claims for personal injury or death to the indemnitor's
employees or agents or to the employees or agents of the indemnitor's
subcontractors if the parties agree in writing that the indemnity obligation
will be supported by available liability insurance coverage to be furnished
by the indemnitor.
TEXAS CrV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 127.005 (Vernon 1986).
116. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., 107 N.M. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55. See Tade,
The Texas and LouisianaAnti-Indemnity Statutes As Applied to Oil and Gas Industry Offshore
Contracts, 24 Hous. L. REV. 665 (1987). The anti-indemnity statutes of Texas and Louisiana
each have a clause worded similarly to New Mexico's insurance clause. The statutes all provide
that they shall not "affect the validity of an insurance contract." The Texas and Louisiana
statutes avoid the ambiguity found in the New Mexico statute, however, because both add
a further statement either permitting or prohibiting indemnity agreements supported by available
liability insurance coverage furnished by the indemnitor. Texas allows such agreements. TEx.
Civ. PRAc. & REm. CODE ANN § 127.005 (Vernon 1986). Louisiana forbids such agreements.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2780 (West 1987). Since one statute permits and one disallows
indemnity agreements covered by liability insurance, it seems likely that both statutes mean
something different from indemnity agreements covered by indemnitor insurance when they
both purport not to "affect the validity of an insurance contract." Crosby v. General Tire
& Rubber Co., 543 F.2d 1128, 1131 (5th Cir. 1976). Interpreting the insurance clause of
Mississippi's anti-indemnity statute the Fifth Circuit observed, "The drafters of the statute,
we conclude, did not mean to abrogate [traditional] insurance agreements and, perhaps out
of an abundance of caution, they added [the *insurance clause]." Id.
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intent of the New Mexico legislature in passing the statute, a task
not undertaken by the Brashar court." 7
The Action Well Service court also found the Herrera decision,
which relied on Brashar, to be incorrect because neither the district
court nor the court of appeals properly examined the public policy
embodied in the statute."' The Action Well Service court noted that
the court in Herrera should have relied on the holding in Guitard
for its explanation of the legislature's intent in making certain indemnity agreements void." 9
To determine if the contract was void under the well and mine
anti-indemnity statute, the Action Well Service court looked to the
public policy behind the statute. The court found Guitard's examination of the public policy underlying the statute crucial to an
interpretation of the insurance clause:1' 2
First, the public policy behind § 56-7-2(A) is to promote safety.
The indemrnitee, usually the operator of the well or mine, will
not be allowed to delegate to subcontractors his duty to see that
the well or mine is safe. Our interpretation furthers the public
policy behind the statute, which is to promote safety. Both the
operator and the subcontractor will have incentive to monitor
the safety of the operation knowing that they will
be responsible
2
for their respective percentage of negligence.' '
Where the well operator and contractor each remains responsible
for its portion of the damages, each will be encouraged to protect
workers and others from personal injury.'2
The Action Well Service court apparently considered insured indemnity agreements protecting one party from its negligence to be
a means for the indemnified party to side-step responsibility for its
own culpability. Thus, such an agreement would create in the protected party a lesser incentive to monitor workplace safety. 23 Therefore, the court held that the public policy underlying the statute
rendered such agreements void. The court concluded that, given the

117. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., 107 N.M. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55.
118. Id. See supra notes 80 to 93 and accompanying text.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Guitard v. Mobil Oil Corp., 100 N.M. at 361-62, 670 P.2d at 972-73).
121. Guitard, 100 N.M. at 361-62, 670 P.2d at 972-73. Here Texas and New Mexico diverge
because their policies identify different purposes. Texas notes an inequity fostered upon
contractors. TExAs Civ. PrAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 127.002(a). New Mexico is concerned
about safety in the workplace. Guitard, 100 N.M. at 358, 670 P.2d at 969. Cf. WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 4.24.115 (1986) (anti-indemnity statute for construction industry). "The purpose
of this chapter is to enact further reforms in order to create a more equitable distribution
of the cost and risk of injury and increase the availability and affordability of insurance."
Bailie, Indemnification Agreements, 23 Wni. ETTE L. REv. 305, 310 (1987) (citing WASH.
Rcv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.115 (1986)).
122. Guitard, 100 N.M. 358, 670 P.2d 969 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 327, 670
P.2d 581 (1983).
123. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., 107 N.M. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55.
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public policy aimed at safety, the insurance clause could not have
been intended as an exception to the statute and could therefore
only represent the legislature's intention to preserve contracts of
insurance between an individual party and its insurers for the party's
own negligence. 24
The court refused to go beyond Guitard's flat prohibition of
indemnity agreements that hold the indemnitee harmless for its own
negligence. 25 The court stated that New Mexico would not apply
26
the insurance clause as it had been applied in Brasharand Herrera.
It explained that the clause was intended to protect a party's ability
2 7
to insure its own interests, not the interests of the indemnitee.'
C. Implications of Action Well Service
The application of the statute poses problems, even with the
interpretation by Guitard2 and Action Well Service. 29 After Action
Well Service the questions remain whether oil and gas companies
and their independent contractors can find other ways to avoid
liability for the companies' negligence and whether an oil company
may insure indemnity contracts that are not prohibited by the well
and mine anti-indemnity statute. Unless the legislature chooses to
clarify the New Mexico statute as some other state legislatures have
done, 130 potential for further litigation remains.
Action Well Service succeeded in sharply curtailing a company's
ability to shift liability for its negligence to the independent contractor. An oil company that settles a negligence claim against it
cannot recover the amount of its settlement under an indemnity
contract even if the contractually assumed liability is covered by
insurance.'
An insured indemnity agreement, however, is not the only means
by which oil companies shift responsibility for company negligence
to the independent contractor. Oil companies often draft the master
service contract to include a provision requiring the independent
contractor to maintain insurance for itself and name the oil company
as an additional insured. 3 2 Designating an oil company an additional
insured on the contractor's liability insurance brings the company
within the general coverage of the policy, although sometimes with

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
100 N.M. at 360, 670 P.2d at 971.
107 N.M. at 210, 755 P.2d at 54.

130. See infra note 134.
131. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., 107 N.M. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55.
132. See, e.g., Brashar v. Mobil Oil Corp., 626 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.M. 1984); Babineaux
v. McBroom Rig Bldg. Serv., Inc., 806 F.2d 1282, held in abeyance by 811 F.2d 852, issuance
of mandate ordered 817 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1987).
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limitations regarding the extent of coverage.' 33 Such an agreement
does not appear to be prohibited by the language of the antiindemnity statute. No New Mexico case has dealt with whether
companies may be included as additional named insureds on the
independent contractor's liability insurance, and section 56-7-2(A)
contains no specific language concerning the issue.
The New Mexico anti-indemnity statute does not specifically bar
this practice.' 34 Using the statute to disallow recovery of a company's
claim under an additional named insured endorsement would be
problematic. No indemnity agreement exists to bring the claim under
the well and mine anti-indemnity statute. Thus, to bring the claim
under the statute, the court would have to construe the parties'
agreement regarding the additional named insured endorsement as
an agreement sufficiently similar to an indemnity agreement to invoke
the statutory prohibition.
Requiring additional named insured endorsements is not expressly
prohibited by the language of the well and line anti-indemnity
statute or by the holding in Action Well Service; however, oil
companies need to be aware of two areas where the practice may
be vulnerable to attack. First, the Action Well Service court based
its holding on public policy.' 3 An additional named insured endorsement may well be contrary to the underlying public policy that
all parties involved in oil field work monitor the safety of the
operation. 36 Including an oil company as an additional insured on
the contractor's policy produces virtually the same result as the
indemnity agreements proscribed by the statute: the contractor accepts
responsibility for the company's negligence by paying the cost of
including an additional insured on the policy. The practice of adding
the company to the contractor's insurance effectively frees the company from the consequences of its own negligence.
Second, the Action Well Service court framed its conclusion in
language that may reach more broadly than the result in the case.
The court stated that a party may insure to protect its own interests,
not the interests of the other party.'3 7 In future cases the court might

133. See, e.g., 7 Am.Jut. 2D Automobile Insurance-Persons Covered § 246 (1980).
134. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-7-2(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1986). For a statute which specifically
prohibits this practice see LA. REv. STAT. ANN § 9:2780(G) (West 1987):
G. Any provision in any agreement arising out of the operations, services,
or activities listed in Subsection C of this Section of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950 which requires waivers of subrogation, additional named
insured endorsements, or any other form of insurance protection which would
frustrate or circumvent the prohibitions of this Section, shall be null and
void and of no force and effect.
See Babineaux v. McBroom Rig Bldg. Serv., Inc., 806 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1987) (subsection
G expressly invalidates agreements requiring "additional named insured endorsements.")
135. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., 107 N.M. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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decide that requiring an additional named insured endorsement
amounts to impermissibly requiring the independent contractor to
insure another's interest.
The broad language of the Action Well Service holding' raises
another question. The court does not explain exactly what the indemnitor's "interests" include.3 9 By expressly rejecting the holding
of Herrera, the court is obviously voiding insured indemnity agreements for a party's own negligence.140 However, a party's insurable
interests are conceivably greater than simply the liability stemming
from its own negligence.' 4' If the Action Well Service language "not
the interests of the indemnitee"14 2 precludes insuring any indemnity
agreement at all in the well or gas setting, companies would be
unable to require the additional security of contractual liability
insurance. Thus, it is not absolutely clear that under the broad
language of Action Well Service a court would permit a company
to insure the sort of indemnity contract declared allowable in
Guitard.14 However, such a reading would be over-inclusive because
the rationales in both Guitard and Action Well Service look to the
public policy behind the well and mine anti-indemnity statute to
find that workplace safety is enhanced by holding each party responsible for its own negligence. Preventing insurance for agreements
covering liability arising other than from a party's own negligence
might increase the company's commitment to safety, but would
thereby decrease the commitment of the independent contractor. The
responsibility for safety should be evenly distributed for maximum
effect. '4
Insurable indemnity contracts under Guitard would include those
that indemnify an oil company for its vicarious liability arising from
the independent contractor's negligence. 45 Companies working in the
oil and gas industry typically work through independent contractors
to avoid the master-servant relationship and its consequent respondeat
superior liability. Despite their attempts to avoid responsibility for
the independent contractor's negligence, companies may, in certain
circumstances, have vicarious liability imposed upon them by law. '4

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 43 AM.JuR. 2D Insurance-Liability Insurance § 1002 (1982). "(Insurable interest-]
whether [insured] may be charged at law or in equity with the liability against which the
insurance is taken out."
142. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Action Well Serv., 107 N.M. at 211, 755 P.2d at 55.
143. See supra notes 40 to 62 and accompanying text.
144. Guitard, 100 N.M. 358, 670 P.2d 969.
145. Id.
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 416-429 Introductory Note (1%5):
The rules stated in the following [sections] . . .do not rest upon any personal
negligence of the employer. They are rules of vicarious liability, making the
employer liable for the negligence of the independent contractor, irrespective
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Under New Mexico law, when the specific activity is deemed inherently dangerous, the company cannot avoid liability for the independent contractor's negligence. 47 After Guitard such liability
apparently could still be covered by an indemnity agreement. 4 An
allowable agreement would require the independent contractor to
indemnify the company where the company had paid a judgment
under a respondeat superior theory for the negligence of the independent contractor.
Such an indemnity contract would be beneficial to an oil company
for two reasons. Making a claim for indemnity under a contractual
right is more advantageous for a company than making a claim for
indemnity under a common law right. Historically, if a company
were held vicariously liable, any negligence on the company's part
eliminated its common law right of indemnification by the independent contractor.' 4 9 However, Guitard's interpretation of the statute as voiding only indemnity agreements for a party's own negligence
would presumably allow contractual indemnification of a concurrently negligent company for any part of a judgment that held the
company vicariously liable for the independent contractor's negligence. 50
Additionally, an indemnity agreement may allow an oil company
to recover attorney's fees in some instances. Although a company
cannot recover fees under a common law claim for indemnification, 5 '

of whether the-employer has himself been at fault. They arise in situations
in which, for reasons of policy, the employer is not permitted to shift the
responsibility for the proper conduct of the work to the contractor. The
liability imposed is closely analogous to that of a master for the negligence
of his servant.
147. Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661. 663, 262 P.2d 231, 232 (1953) ("It is a general
rule that an employer is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor; however,
there are certain exceptions to the rule. Work that is intrinsically and inherently dangerous
") See REsTATEMENT (SECOND)
in performance is not delegable so as to escape liability ..
OF ToRTs § 427 (1965). For limitation of section 427 in New Mexico see New Mexico Elec.
Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 89 N.M. 278, 281, 551 P.2d 634, 637 (1976) (employer of contractor

not liable to injured employee of contractor).
148. Guitard, 100 N.M. 358, 670 P.2d 969 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 327, 670
P.2d 581 (1983).
149. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Welch, 78 N.M. 494, 495. 433 P.2d 79, 80 (1967) ("(A]
tortfeasor's employer who has been held liable on the theory of respondeat superior may
recover indemnification from the tortfeasor only where the employer's liability is based solely
upon that doctrine and where there is no actual or active negligence on the part of the
employer."). See Trujillo v. Berry, 106 N.M. 86, 88, 738 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 106 N.M. 24, 738 P.2d 518 (1987) ("Notwithstanding the adoption of the comparative
negligence doctrine, we believe New Mexico still adheres to traditional indemnity principles
in some circumstances."). See Several Liability Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(2) (1987).
150. See Guitard, 100 N.M. 358, 670 P.2d 969 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 327,
670 P.2d 581 (1983).
151. Gregg v. Gardner, 73 N.M. 347, 360, 388 P.2d 68, 77 (1963) (the general rule in
New Mexico is that attorney's fees are not an item of damages). See Annotation, IndemnityLiability of Subcontractor 68 A.L.R.3d 7, 64 (1976) ("The costs of prosecuting indemnity
clauses is generally denied in the absence of an express agreement.").

(Vol. 20

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

a company can recover certain attorney's fees if provided for in an
indemnity contract.'
A company cannot require the contractor to indemnify it for
attorney's fees incurred in the company's defense against its own
negligence because the language of the statute prohibits indemnification for "any loss arising . . . from the negligence of the indemnitee.'1 5 However, the attorney's fees incurred in defending
against vicarious liability and in successfully prosecuting the indemnity claim are presumably allowable under Guitard and insurable
under Action Well Service.
Indemnity agreements may retain their usefulness to oil companies
despite the oil companies' practice of requiring additional insured
endorsements. Therefore, the added security of contractual liability
insurance supporting the agreements also remains important. It is
almost certain that the Action Well Service decision does not eliminate
a company's right to insure allowable indemnity contracts in the oil
and gas industries. If the indemnity contract is permitted, it should
be insurable.
IV. CONCLUSION
The well and mine anti-indemnity statute voids any indemnity
provision in an agreement concerning oil, gas, and water wells or
an agreement concerning mines for minerals when the agreement
holds a party harmless for its own negligence. The statute also
states that it will not affect the validity of insurance contracts.
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Amoco Production Co. v.
Action Well Service, Inc. refused to read the insurance clause as
an exception to the statute that would allow a party to contract
away liability for its own negligence by requiring the indemnitor
to cover the indemnity agreement with contractual liability insurance. As a result, oil and gas companies can no longer avoid their
liability for negligence through the means of an indemnity agreement
covered by insurance. Two questions of interest to oil and gas
companies remain unresolved. Action Well Service does not address
whether the court will limit oil and gas companies' practice of
requiring independent contractors to add the company to the independent contractor's liability insurance as an additional named
insured. Nor is it clear whether Action Well Service invalidates
contractual liability insurance coverage of indemnity agreements
addressing liability other than the indemnitee's own negligence.
LINDA M. RAMSEY

152. Annotation, Indemnity-Liability of Subcontractor 68 A.L.R.3d 7, 64 (1976).
153. See supra note 2.

